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2.1  Introduction 
A generation ago, America had two starkly different legal policies 
governing collective bargaining and union activity-one for employees 
of the government and another for employees of private corporations. 
The erosion of  this difference, as more and more states have enacted 
public sector bargaining laws patterned after the National Labor Re- 
lations Act  (NLRA), is one of  the most  important developments in 
American labor law since 1947. These important legal changes, how- 
ever, came as a surprise to most industrial relations scholars, and they 
have not been fully explained even retrospectively.  I 
Two states, in particular, confounded general models of legal policy- 
making in  public sector labor relations: Ohio and Illinois. They were 
exceptions for two reasons. First, although both were industrialized, 
highly  unionized  states located in  the  North,  neither  had  a statute 
granting public employees the right to bargain. (The other states lacking 
such statutes, e.g., Mississippi, North Carolina, and Utah, were gen- 
erally  more  conservative  states located  in  the  South or the Rocky 
Mountains.) Kochan (1973, 336-37)  noted that the lack of bargaining 
laws in Ohio and Illinois was anomalous even in the early 1970s, when 
many states lacked such laws. The Ohio-Illinois anomaly became more 
striking during the middle of that decade, as the number of other states 
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lacking bargaining laws declined.  Second, although neither Ohio nor 
Illinois had  a public  sector bargaining statute, they  both  had  many 
public sector collective bargaining contracts. Burton (1979, 15) cited 
this fact when he argued that bargaining laws were not the major im- 
petus behind the spread of public sector bargaining. 
The exceptional status of Ohio and Illinois ended in 1983, when both 
states enacted comprehensive bargaining statutes covering most state 
and local public employees. This chapter examines the reasons why 
those statutes were finally enacted then and also why previous attempts 
to secure legislation failed. The analysis of those reasons is based on 
open-ended interviews with over three dozen union and management 
lobbyists,  legislators,  legislative aides,  labor  lawyers, and other in- 
formed practitioners,  as well  as an examination of  legislative docu- 
ments. Then, the chapter uses quantitative data to measure the impact 
of  these statutes on public sector labor relations in  both states. The 
major conclusions are: 
Bargaining statutes were delayed in Illinois chiefly by the desire of 
the Chicago Democrats to maintain patronage arrangements and in 
Ohio chiefly by the insistence of unions that they get a strongly pro- 
union statute or none at all. 
The enactment of the bargaining statutes in those two states in  1983 
was the result of idiosyncratic political events and not of a general 
trend toward public sector unionism. 
The enactment of these bargaining statutes brought a substantial 
increase in  the extent of bargaining coverage in Ohio and Illinois, 
even though public sector bargaining had been widespread in both 
states for  years.  Some public  employers,  however,  resisted  the 
unionization of their employees even after the 1983 bargaining stat- 
utes were passed, which is something that generally did not happen 
after the public sector statutes enacted earlier in other states. 
The Illinois statute strengthened the bargaining power of  teacher 
unions which had already bargained before the statute. (No baseline 
data were available on bargaining outcomes prior to 1983 for other 
employee groups in Illinois or for public employees in Ohio.) 
The data underlying these conclusions are presented in the following 
sections, beginning with the history of public sector bargaining laws in 
Ohio and Illinois. 
2.2  History of  Public Sector Bargaining Law in Ohio 
Before  1983, Ohio’s public sector labor relations  were largely un- 
regulated by law. There were, however, some statutes and court de- 
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as well  as a host  of  bills  that failed to be enacted. The first  major 
developments came in 1947, when the same national tide that brought 
the Taft-Hartley Act brought two efforts to curb public sector unions 
in Ohio. In January 1947, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in Hagerman 
v. Dayton2  that local governments could not permit voluntary deduction 
of union dues from their employees’ paychecks. The court went on to 
declare that municipal contracts with unions were an improper dele- 
gation of governmental authority. A few months later, the Ohio legis- 
lature enacted the Ferguson Act,,  which banned public employee strikes 
and provided for dismissal of strikers. Furthermore, any striker who 
was rehired would get no pay increase for one year and would be on 
probation for two years. 
Supporters of public sector unions tried to overcome these two 1947 
setbacks, although their efforts accomplished little until 1959. In 1947, 
shortly after the Hagerman ruling, two bills were introduced that would 
have authorized public sector bargaining,4 but both bills died in com- 
mittee. Then, following the Democratic victory in the 1948 legislative 
elections, the House passed bills to repeal the Ferguson Act5 and to 
protect the right of public employees to join unions.6 The Ferguson 
Act repeal bill, however, was voted down in the Senate,’ and the bill 
protecting the right to join unions never came up for a Senate vote. 
Several other bills were introduced in the next decade; the most suc- 
cessful of them died in a Senate committee after passing the House. 
In 1958, the national tide toward the Democrats was strengthened 
in Ohio by a right-to-work referendum, which mobilized the labor vote. 
As a result, the Democrats won simultaneous control of both houses 
of the legislature and the governorship for the first time  since their 
victory  in the 1948  elections, and Ohio’s  second public  sector labor 
statute was enacted. In 1959, a state senator (who happened also to be 
a staff representative for the United Steelworkers of America) intro- 
duced a bill that would have protected the right of public employees 
to join a union, authorized informal negotiations, and overturned the 
Hagerman ruling that outlawed union dues checkoff. Amendments nar- 
rowed the bill so that it simply authorized dues checkoff. The bill was 
then passed and signed into law.8 
In the  1960s, the major legal  development was  the frequent non- 
enforcement of anti-union  provisions  of the law. First to fall by  the 
wayside was the portion of the Hagerman ruling that declared public 
sector bargaining an improper delegation of governmental authority. 
Cincinnati,  which  had bargained informally  with the American  Fed- 
eration of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) ever 
since the 1940s (Heisel interview), formalized the relationship begin- 
ning in  1960. By  1968, all of the other major cities in Ohio (Akron, 
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contracts with AFSCME.9 Teachers and fire fighters began bargaining 
too. 
Meanwhile, employers were becoming reluctant to invoke the Fer- 
guson Act’s severe strike penalties. For example, in January  1967 an 
AFSCME local representing sanitation and snow removal workers in 
Toledo went on strike. During the strike, the city government “insisted 
it would enforce Ohio’s Ferguson Act . . . [but it later decided] to adopt 
a ‘forgive and forget’ attitude.”ln Similarly, in March 1969, when water 
and sewer workers in the city of Warren, Ohio, struck, the city actually 
invoked the Ferguson Act and “said  it cannot negotiate because the 
strikers have been fired.””  After ten days, though, the city settled the 
strike by  signing a new contract, letting the strikers have their jobs 
back, and indicating that  the city  would not  challenge the  strikers’ 
appeal to have the Ferguson Act penalties overturned.  Furthermore, 
there were many cases (beginning in  the second half of the 1960s) of 
strikes by teachers, sanitation workers, and even police and fire fighters 
where the employer did not even seriously threaten to invoke the Fer- 
guson Act. The Ferguson Act penalties were invoked and enforced in 
a few rare cases, the first of which was a 1967 strike by  workers in a 
county welfare department home,13  but they generally came to be seen 
as too harsh to use. 
At about the same time, teachers began to press vigorously for bar- 
gaining legislation, with the result that a “professional negotiations” 
bill covering only school employees was almost passed by the 1967- 
68 legislature. In the beginning of 1967, the Ohio Education Association 
(OEA) set as its top legislative priority a teacher negotiation bill that 
provided  exclusive recognition  to the teacher  organization  with the 
largest membership in the district.  l4  The Ohio Federation of Teachers 
(OFT) opposed this bill, preferring recognition by  secret ballot elec- 
tion.IS (The American Federation of Teachers had won the  1965 rep- 
resentation election  in Philadelphia16 and was soon to win  the  1967 
representation election in Baltim~re,~’  despite having a smaller mem- 
bership in those school systems). Even without OFT support, however, 
the bill passed the Senate, and its prospects in the House were improved 
in December 1967 when the OEA raised its dues from $18 per year to 
$29 (partly to have more money for lobbying).1s  The House passed the 
bill, after amending it. On the last day of the 1968 legislative session, 
however, the Senate rejected the House amendments, while the House 
adhered to them, with the result that the bill died.I9 The chief lobbyist 
for the OEA claimed that this last minute death in the legislature was 
the work of Republican Governor James Rhodes, who did not want to 
have to honor his promise to sign the bill if  it reached his desk (Hall 
interview). (Rhodes was to oppose public sector bargaining legislation 
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In 1969, the OEA legislative committee recommended that the OEA 
seek a teacher bargaining law patterned after the NLRA, including the 
provision for secret ballot representation elections. The OEAs  lobbyist 
recalled that the OEA executive board, still committed to “professional 
negotiations”  rather  than  “collective  bargaining,”  opposed the rec- 
ommendation, and a big  fight on the OEA convention floor ensued. 
The convention ultimately accepted the recommendation to seek an 
NLRA-type statute. 
Meanwhile, the Ohio council of AFSCME had also called for public 
sector bargaining legislation and for the repeal of the Ferguson Act.*O 
A bill backed by AFSCME was introduced in the Ohio House of Rep- 
resentatives but made little progress.*’ In  1971, the OEA decided to 
join forces with AFSCME to seek a bill covering all public employees, 
rather than one  just covering teachers (Hall interview), which strength- 
ened the coalition seeking legislation. The joint OEA-AFSCME bills, 
however, were killed during the early 1970s by the Republican chairman 
of the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee (D. Day interview). 
The year  1975 brought a major court ruling and an important legis- 
lative initiative. The court ruling was the Ohio Supreme Court’s de- 
cision in Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of 
Education** that  school  boards  had  authority  to bargain  with  their 
employees and that any contract reached, including a promise to submit 
grievances to binding arbitration, would be enforceable in court. This 
ruling established a favorable legal situation for those teacher unions 
that were strong enough to win recognition. The ruling also reflected 
the de facto acceptance of public sector bargaining in Ohio during the 
1960s and early  1970s, despite the 1947 court ruling in the Hagerman 
case. 
Meanwhile, as a result of  the  1974 elections, the Republicans lost 
control of the Ohio Senate, so there was a new chairman of the Senate 
Commerce and Labor Committee. Ohio’s public employee unions united 
behind S.B. 70, a public sector bargaining bill introduced in 1975 that 
covered all public employees in Ohio. S.B. 70, a very pro-union bill, 
passed  both  houses of  the  legislature  but  was  vetoed by  Governor 
Rhodes. The House of Representatives failed to override the veto, and 
the bill died. 
In the 1976 elections, the Democrats increased their majority in the 
Ohio House of  Representatives,  and Ohio’s public employee unions 
thought that  they had gained a “veto-proof’’  legislature.  In 1977, a 
new bill, S.B. 222, was introduced. S.B. 222 provided a broad scope 
of bargaining, permitted  the agency shop, and legalized most public 
employee strikes. (Interestingly, both unions and employer organiza- 
tions  preferred  the right to strike over binding interest  arbitration). 
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up to sixty days, and police and fire fighter strikes were banned outright; 
but employees enjoined from striking could strike when the sixty-day 
period expired, and police and fire fighters were given interest arbitra- 
tion. The bill did make two major concessions to management: police 
and fire fighter interest arbitration awards could be overturned by a 
three-fifths vote of the city council, and supervisors were excluded 
from the coverage of  the bargaining law unless the individual public 
employer agreed to include them. Despite the concessions, though, the 
bill was more favorable to public employee unions than a large majority 
of public sector bargaining laws in other states. 
The 1977 bill had strong backing. The Ohio AFL-CIO and most public 
employee unions actively supported it, as did one major management 
organization:  the Ohio Municipal League. The leaders of  the league 
had concluded that some sort of  legislation was inevitable; they then 
decided to support the bargaining bill in order to be able to influence 
its terms. (For example, they had sought the ability to overturn interest 
arbitration awards for police and fire fighters, as well as the exclusion 
of supervisors from coverage.) The other management organizations- 
the  school boards  association and the county  boards  association- 
opposed the bill, as did the Teamsters (which was not ready to win 
public  sector representation  elections) (Coleman interview) and the 
Fraternal Order of Police (which was dismayed by the concessions won 
by  the Municipal League); but  opponents were outnumbered in the 
legislature by supporters. The bill passed both houses of the legislature 
and was then vetoed by  Governor Rhodes. This time, though, sup- 
porters of the bill thought that they had the votes to override the veto. 
To  their surprise and dismay, they did not. 
Veto overrides took sixty votes in the House of Representatives, and 
the Democrats had sixty-two. The few Republicans who had voted for 
the bill initially, however, were unwilling to override a veto by a Re- 
publican governor, and three rural Democrats broke party ranks. Thus, 
only fifty-nine voted to override, and the bill died. 
The vote to override the 1977 veto happened to follow shortly after 
a particularly  bitter  strike by  fire fighters in Dayton.  Not  only  did 
buildings burn to the ground  during the  strike, but  there  were  also 
allegations that striking fire fighters had committed arson. Legislators 
reacted negatively to the strike; it may have cost the public employee 
unions the sixtieth and vital vote to override the veto. 
One of the three Democrats voting against the override, Bill  Hinig, 
was a committee chairman; both union and management lobbyists I 
interviewed claimed that the Democratic Assembly Speaker (who ap- 
points committee chairmen) could have swung Hinig’s vote (Brandt, 
Coleman, D. Day, and  Smith interviews). A former legislative staff 
member, by  contrast, argued that if  Hinig had voted to override, then 
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some labor leaders reacted bitterly to Hinig’s defection, and they tried 
to defeat Hinig in the 1978 primary in order to keep all the Democrats 
in line in the future. The Speaker, however, raised $70,000 for Hinig 
and dispatched an aide to manage Hinig’s campaign. The challenge to 
Hinig failed, demonstrating the political weakness of labor. The net 
result, according to two management lobbyists and two former legis- 
lative staff members  I interviewed, was that the OEA and the Ohio 
AFL-CIO lost influence in the legislature. The loss was compounded 
by the  1978 elections, in which Governor Rhodes was reelected and 
the Republicans  gained enough  seats in  the Senate to block a veto 
override. 
In the  1982 elections, the Democrats won simultaneous control of 
the governorship and both houses of  the legislature for the first time 
since 1958. The consequence, in  1983 as in 1959, was that a pro-union 
public sector labor relations bill was enacted into law. The 1983 bill, 
S.B. 133, contained several provisions  that are common in compre- 
hensive public sector labor relations statutes (e.g., representation elec- 
tions, a duty to bargain with majority representatives, a prohibition of 
unfair labor practices, and an administrative agency). In addition, S.B. 
133 contained some provisions which made it more pro-union than the 
1975 bill, the 1977 bill, and most public sector statutes in other states. 
Among these are: 
(1) fact-finding in cases of bargaining impasses, with the fact finder’s 
report becoming binding unless rejected  within seven days by 
either a three-fifths vote of the total  membership of the labor 
organization or a three-fifths vote of the employer’s legislative 
body; 
(2)  if  the fact finder’s report is rejected, a broad right to strike for 
most public employees, and binding interest arbitration (called 
“conciliation” to help secure passage of the bill) for groups such 
as police and fire fighters who are prohibited from striking; 
(3) a ban on lockouts; 
(4)  a broad scope of bargaining (comparable to the NLRA, with the 
addition that “the continuation, modification, or deletion of  an 
existing provision of  a collective bargaining agreement”  is also 
a mandatory subject of bargaining);23 
(5) mandatory dues checkoff and authorization of the agency shop; 
and 
(6) a mandatory grievance procedure, and a declaration that an em- 
ployer’s repeated failure to process grievances in a timely manner 
is an unfair labor practice. 
In  view  of  these pro-union  provisions  (particularly binding interest 
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opposed S.B. 133; but this time, labor had the votes even without the 
Municipal League’s support. The bill became law.24 
2.3  History of Public Sector Bargaining Law  in Illinois 
In  Illinois,  as in Ohio, the campaign for public  sector bargaining 
legislation was a long one. In 1945, both houses of the Illinois legislature 
passed S.B. 427, which authorized public employers to enter into col- 
lective bargaining agreements with their employees, provided that these 
agreements prohibited strikes and lockouts during the term of the con- 
tract. The governor, however, vetoed the  It would take thirty- 
eight years before the legislature passed  another bill that authorized 
bargaining for a broad spectrum of public employees. 
Despite this setback, unions were able to secure the enactment of 
several relatively early, but narrow, public sector labor relations stat- 
utes, as noted in the Wagner Commission report (1967, D21-22): 
1. a  1945 statute authorizing  the Chicago Transit  Authority  to 
continue the collective bargaining procedures employed when the 
transit system was privately owned; 
2. a 1951 statute authorizing the University Civil Service System 
to negotiate with organizations representing nonacademic employees 
on wages and other conditions of employment; 
3. a 1951 statute authorizing municipalities to submit wage nego- 
tiation impasses with fire fighters to fact-finding; 
4. a section in the 1955 State Personnel Code authorizing the State 
Director of Personnel to negotiate with regard to the pay, hours of 
work, or other working conditions of employees subject to the State 
Personnel Code; 
5. a 1961 statute authorizing voluntary checkoff of union dues for 
state employees; and 
6.  a  1963 statute permitting local governmental agencies to au- 
thorize the voluntary checkoff of union dues. 
None of these statutes, however, established recognition election pro- 
cedures, required  public employers to bargain, or prohibited  public 
employers from interfering with the unionization of their employees. 
The next major legal development came from the courts. When the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) local in Chicago won exclusive 
recognition from the school board, the National Education Association 
(NEA) affiliate filed suit. In 1966, a circuit court  judge ruled (in Chicago 
Division of  the Illinois Education Association  v. Board of  Education 
of  the City  of  Chicago) that, even without express statutory authori- 
zation, the Chicago school board could grant exclusive bargaining rights 
to a bargaining agent selected by the teachers. The ruling was affirmed 
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In July  1966, Governor Otto Kerner appointed the Wagner Com- 
mission, which was to recommend appropriate policies for public sector 
labor relations. At the time he appointed the commission, Kerner said 
that he would try to get a bill enacted provided that the bill did not 
grant the right to strike. As Milton Derber, vice-chairman of the com- 
mission,  later pointed  out  (1968,  552-53),  AFSCME was willing to 
accept a strike ban to get a bargaining statute, but the AFT-which 
had won gains in Chicago by striking-was  not. Moreover, the building 
trades, afraid that a bargaining statute might threaten their craft juris- 
diction, adopted a strong stance against a strike ban as a means of 
blocking a bill. Despite AFSCME’s assertion that labor could not real- 
istically expect Illinois to legalize public employee strikes when  no 
other state had done so (Clark 1969, 171-72),  the state AFL-CIO, too, 
came out against any bill that banned strikes. 
The Wagner Commission’s report (1967) recommended the enact- 
ment of a statute that would declare public sector strikes illegal and 
explicitly authorize courts to issue antistrike injunctions. They also 
recommended giving all public employees the right to bargain and es- 
tablishing an administrative agency to determine units, conduct rep- 
resentation elections, and enforce a prohibition of unfair labor practices; 
but their proposed statute was doomed to falter on the strike issue. A 
bill based on the commission’s recommendation, S.B.  452, was easily 
passed by the Senate. Democrats in the House, supported by a minority 
of the Republicans, amended the bill to delete the strike prohibition. 
The bill then passed the House. When a conference committee restored 
the strike prohibition, the House voted down the bill, and the bill died. 
As Clark (1979, 172) noted: “Despite the explicit backing of Governor 
Kerner [a Democrat], only two Democrats in the House voted for the 
bill.” 
In  1973, another Democratic governor was thwarted  in  his efforts 
to get a bargaining bill through the legislature. Daniel Walker, elected 
governor after making a campaign promise to give public employees 
the right to bargain, responded to the legislature’s defeat of bargaining 
legislation by unilaterally issuing Executive Order No. 6, which granted 
bargaining rights to state employees under the jurisdiction of the gov- 
ernor.*’ Although the order did not apply to employees of state uni- 
versities and employees under the jurisdiction of state officers other 
than the governor, it still gave bargaining rights to approximately 60,000 
Illinois state employees. AFSCME organized most of these employees, 
thereby gaining additional political clout that would be helpful in future 
lobbying. 
Bargaining bills in the 1970s repeatedly followed a pattern of success 
in the House, defeat in the Senate. This occurred even after the Dem- 
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Democrats resisted legislation. Changes, however, were soon to come 
in the bargaining policy of Chicago itself. 
In 1979, Jane Byrne was elected mayor of  Chicago, after making a 
campaign promise to negotiate collective bargaining agreements with 
the fire fighters and police. A few months after her election, she ap- 
pointed a planning board to recommend a collective bargaining policy 
for city employees.28  In January 1980, Byrne sent the planning board’s 
proposed bargaining ordinance to the city council.  During the same 
week, the fire fighters union-concerned  that Byrne might renege on 
her campaign promise-threatened  to strike if Byrne did not agree to 
sign a collective bargaining contract.29  The building trades, however, 
disliked the planning board’s proposal of having only a few large bar- 
gaining units (D’Alba interview). In early February 1980, the Chicago 
Federation of  Labor came out against the proposed ~rdinance.~~  With 
that, the bargaining ordinance was doomed-it  never even came to a 
vote. 
The Chicago fire fighters, however, were not deterred. In February 
and March, they conducted a twenty-three-day strike, the longest fire 
fighter strike in U.S. history. The strike, called over the issue of  who 
would be included in the bargaining unit, resulted in an interim agree- 
ment on noneconomic issues, with economic issues to be submitted to 
interest  arbitration if  the parties  could not reach  agreement.3’ This 
interim agreement was the first formal contract that the Chicago fire 
fighters had ever had, and it was followed a year later by a contract 
covering the Chicago police.32 
Meanwhile, the legislature was inching toward a statute providing 
collective bargaining rights to teachers. In 1973, the legislature enacted 
a bill (H.B. 1303) requiring school boards to provide dues checkoff to 
teacher  organization^.^^ In  1981, the legislature (despite a Republican 
majority in the House) went considerably farther, enacting H.B. 701 .34 
This latter bill: (1) established a procedure for unit determination and 
representation elections to select exclusive bargaining representatives, 
(2) authorized negotiation of binding grievance arbitration, and (3) au- 
thorized negotiation of  agency shop agreements. Since the Illinois Ed- 
ucation Association  (1EA)-the  chief backer of  the bill-stressed  its 
separateness from the rest of the Illinois labor movement, unit deter- 
mination and the conduct of representation elections were assigned to 
the regional superintendents of  education rather than to a state labor 
relations agency. H.B. 701, however, stopped short of establishing a 
duty to bargain, and it did not prohibit unfair labor practices. In some 
cases, school boards refused to bargain after an H.B. 701 election, such 
refusal being perfectly legal. 
By  1983, the time for comprehensive bargaining legislation had ar- 
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lished a duty to bargain and granted a broad  right to strike (except 
where the public health  and safety  would be endangered). The first 
H.B. 1530, covered employees of  public schools, colleges, and 
universities  and was backed  enthusiastically  by the IEA. The IEAs 
rival, the Illinois Federation of  Teachers (IFT), was less enthusiastic 
but also backed the bill, perhaps because a bill covering only teachers 
seemed to have better prospects of passage than the more comprehen- 
sive legislation that the IFT preferred. The second  S.B. 536, was 
an AFL-CIO bill covering almost all public employees, including ed- 
ucational employees.  As originally passed, the two bills differed in 
their administrative provisions: H.B. 1530 was to be administered by 
the regional superintendents of education, while S.B. 536 was to be 
administered by two special labor relations boards-one for Chicago 
and Cook County employees and the other for employees of other local 
governments and of the state. (Chicago Mayor Harold Washington had 
insisted on the separate board for Chicago and Cook County since he 
did not want gubernatorial appointees to set labor policy for his city.) 
H.B. 1530 also lacked some of the management rights provisions which 
had been added to S.B. 536 in order to get it through the legislature. 
When the bills reached the governor, Republican Jim Thompson, he 
invoked an Illinois procedure known as the “amendatory veto.” In this 
procedure, the governor designates changes in a bill that will make the 
bill  acceptable, and  if  the legislature  enacts those  changes, the bill 
becomes law.  Despite  a lobbying campaign by  management  groups, 
such as the Municipal League, the governor left both bills substantially 
intact. His amendatory veto did, however, change the educational bill 
(H.B.  1530) to make it more like the comprehensive bill (S.B. 536): 
H.B. 1530 was to be administered by a special labor relations board, 
rather  than  by  the regional superintendents of  education,  and H.B. 
1530 was to include management rights provisions similar to those in 
S.B. 536. 
These changes eliminated the public policy rationale for having a 
separate educational bill, since Governor Thompson could have achieved 
similar results by vetoing the educational bill and leaving teachers cov- 
ered by the comprehensive bill. (His amendatory veto of the compre- 
hensive  bill  had  deleted  educational  employees  from  coverage). 
Furthermore,  Thompson’s  action  had  the  disadvantage  of  simulta- 
neously creating three separate administrative agencies (one for edu- 
cational employees, one for noneducational employees of Chicago and 
Cook County, and one for all other public employees), which might 
eventually issue inconsistent rulings. Nevertheless, a political rationale 
for Governor Thompson’s action remained: the IEA was eager to have 
a separate bill, for which it could claim credit, and Thompson owed 
his narrow victory in the 1982 election to IEA support. He repaid the 52  Gregory M. Saltzman 
debt on 23  September 1983, when  he  signed H.B.  1530  at an  IEA 
meeting before hundreds of cheering IEA members. 
Police and fire fighters also ended up with a separate bill, although 
that was not their original intention. The International Association of 
Fire Fighters (IAFF) had endorsed the comprehensive bill sponsored 
by  the AFL-CIO (S.B.  536), which banned strikes by  public safety 
employees and  substituted  binding interest  arbitration.  The  Senate 
passed the AFL-CIO bill essentially intact, but the House added amend- 
ments that the IAFF found unacceptable. Although the House leaders 
were Democrats friendly to the labor movement, they objected to bind- 
ing interest arbitration; they therefore amended the bill to allow ov- 
errides of arbitration awards by a simple majority of the city council. 
Furthermore, in order to get Mayor Washington’s support for the bill, 
they added a management rights clause that would have taken away 
manning rules then present in Chicago’s contracts with the fire fighters 
and police. Finally, the House amended the bill to exclude supervisors, 
using a broad definition of supervisors that would eliminate many IAFF 
members from the bargaining unit. Because of these amendments, the 
IAFF requested that public safety employees be excluded from cov- 
erage in the AFL-CIO bill. The House promptly accommodated that 
request, and the Senate concurred. 
In  1985, the IAFF and the (politically less powerful) police unions 
came back with a new bill, H.B.  1529. This bill, while less desirable 
from the  IAFF point  of  view  than  the original  1983  AFL-CIO bill, 
nevertheless addressed some of  the IAFF’s concerns about the 1983 
House amendments. First, H.B.  1529 required a three-fifths majority 
of the city council (and not a simple majority) to override an interest 
arbitration award. Second, it permitted fire fighters (but generally not 
police) to bargain over manning. Finally, it redefined “supervisor”  so 
that police and fire fighter captains would often remain in the unit-an 
important change because captains can make up one-third of the fire 
department work force in a small city. 
The IAFF accepted the three-fifths override provision in  the 1985 
bill for two reasons. First, it might have been impossible to get a bill 
enacted with fully binding interest arbitration: the House Democratic 
leaders opposed binding interest arbitration, and Governor Thompson 
had threatened to veto any bill that required it. Second, the IAFF had 
simultaneously sponsored a second bill in  the  1985  legislature (H.B. 
1539) which overturned  “little  Hatch Acts”  that  restricted  political 
activities by  public safety employees. According to the Illinois state 
president of  the IAFF, H.B. 1539 made the arbitration override pro- 
vision more palatable by making it easier for fire fighters to campaign 
against any city council member who voted to override an arbitration 
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1539, he did not, according to the Illinois AFL-CIO’s chief lobbyist, 
fight hard to have his veto sustained (Walsh interview). The result was 
that the legislature overrode his veto on 30 October 1985.37  With H.B. 
1539 enacted, the legislature approved H.B.  1529 the same day.3n 
2.4  Failure and Fulfillment: The Underlying Reasons 
What accounts for the long delays in enacting bargaining statutes in 
Ohio and Illinois? What happened in 1983 that finally brought legisla- 
tion? The answers for the two states differ slightly, but there are some 
common elements. 
2.4.1 
The first element is political patronage. Some politicians  opposed 
bargaining legislation because the development of collective bargaining 
would undermine their political machines. Union contracts requiring 
just cause for discharge would make it harder for officials of one po- 
litical party to fire workers who had been hired by the opposing party. 
Similarly, seniority bidding rules would make it harder for officials to 
use the threat of transfers, job assignments to dirty duty, and assign- 
ments to work on holidays to pressure current employees to contribute 
labor or money to the party in power.  Finally, union contracts could 
also prohibit the assignment of specific patronage duties that had pre- 
viously been routinely expected. For example, the contract negotiated 
by the Teamsters with the City of Chicago (after the 1983 bargaining 
law was passed) specified that covered employees need not come out 
for city parades without pay (Carmell interview). 
Ohio has both early and contemporary examples of patronage.  A 
dramatic incident in 1947 demonstrated both the existence of patronage 
and the potential threat to patronage posed by public employee union- 
ization. According to a monthly publication of the Ohio AFL-CIO: 
One of the events which triggered passage of the Ferguson Act was 
the firing  of  1,000 unclassified  highway  department workers-all 
Democrats-in  the Chillicothe area. [Republican] Governor Herbert 
fired  them when  he  took office  in  January  1947, having  defeated 
Frank J. Lausche. The highway  workers . . . thought joining  the 
union [AFSCME] would  save their jobs. When union membership 
didn’t protect them from being fired, the highway workers went on 
strike despite the fact they  were no longer state employees. That 
prompted Ferguson to rewrite New York’s Condon-Wadlin Act and 
introduce it.39 
According to several of those I interviewed, Ohio still had widespread 
political patronage even in the 198Os, at least at the county government 
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level.  The lobbyist  for Ohio AFSCME said, “When a  new  county 
engineer is elected from a different party, he appoints new bulldozer 
operators”  (Morgan interview).  A management  lobbyist added, “In 
many Ohio counties, the civil service system is, in practice, limited to 
the welfare department, which is funded and regulated by the federal 
government” (Coleman interview). In the view of both of these lob- 
byists, the desire to defend patronage induced  many county officials 
in Ohio to oppose bargaining legislation. 
Patronage was an even more important barrier to bargaining legis- 
lation in Illinois because it weakened  support for bargaining in what 
would normally be a state’s greatest stronghold of pro-bargaining sen- 
timent: the big-city Democrats. Most of the practitioners I interviewed 
in Illinois attributed the long delay in enacting a bargaining law there 
to the opposition  of the Chicago/Cook County Democratic machine. 
As  an assistant to Governor Thompson put it, “In the old days, only 
downstate Democrats supported collective bargaining, and they were 
too small a group to pass anything by  themselves.  The Republicans 
and the Chicago Democrats opposed the bills, so the bills never went 
anywhere” (Bedgood interview). 
The monolithic opposition  of the Chicago Democrats to any bar- 
gaining legislation began to erode in the late 1970s. In part, this stemmed 
from two federal  court rulings  restricting  patronage.  The first case, 
Efrod v.  Burns,40  arose when a newly  elected  Democratic sheriff  in 
Cook County fired patronage employees appointed by his Republican 
predecessor. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in  this case, issued  in 
1976, said that patronage employees in non-policy-making jobs could 
not  be fired  solely because a new political  party took office. Three 
years later, a federal district judge issued a ruling in the second case 
Shakman  v.  Democratic  Organization of  Cook Co~nty,~’  which  pro- 
hibited  basing hiring or promotion on political work for the party in 
power. (The Shakman ruling did not, however, effectively prevent more 
subtle measures such as better job assignments  for active precinct 
workers.) 
Perhaps more important than these court rulings was the December 
1976 death of Mayor Richard Daley, who had opposed bargaining leg- 
islation and had been able to marshal1 a solid bloc of  Chicago Demo- 
cratic legislators to support his position. Jane Byrne, campaigning for 
mayor as an “outsider”  in  1979, said  she would  support collective 
bargaining if elected. One union leader noted that she changed her mind 
after she won  because  she then  saw  the Democratic machine  as a 
political asset that she could control and not as a barrier to her election 
as mayor. But a mayor was soon to come who was more resolute in 
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That mayor was Harold Washington, who defeated Byrne in a racially 
divisive primary  election in February 1983. Washington’s black  sup- 
porters saw the Chicago patronage  system as a way of perpetuating 
the white power structure; if  bargaining would help dismantle patron- 
age, so much the better. Moreover, AFSCME had been one of the few 
organized  groups  to campaign  for  Washington  in  the  primary,  and 
AFSCME wanted bargaining rights for city workers. Finally, Harold 
Washington had a philosophical commitment to public sector bargain- 
ing; as a state senator in  1979, he was one of two sponsors of a fairly 
pro-union bargaining bill.42  With Washington’s electoral victory, a sub- 
stantial block of Chicago Democrats came out in support of bargaining 
legislation.  Despite the continued  opposition  of Cook County Com- 
missioner George Dunne and some other machine Democrats, the sup- 
port of the mayor of Chicago gained enough legislative support for a 
bargaining bill that such a bill soon passed. 
2.4.2  Lack of Incentives for Strong Unions 
The second reason for the long delay in enacting bargaining  legis- 
lation in Ohio and Illinois was that many union leaders felt that they 
could live with the pre-statute legal situation. Unions that were strong 
enough to win bargaining rights did well without a statute and hence 
concluded that it was better to have no bargaining statute at all than 
to have a bad one. In both states, the politically powerful  state edu- 
cation associations had already won collective bargaining contracts for 
most of their members in the absence  of a statute mandating recognition 
and bargaining. Moreover, courts in both states had ruled that these 
contracts were legally permissible and, in Ohio at least, enforceable in 
court. A statute would have allowed the state education associations 
to win recognition in small, rural districts (since the AFT was unlikely 
to provide  strong competition  in  such districts), and it  would  have 
helped them win agency shop agreements. OEA leaders, however, told 
me in  1980 that they did not think that these gains would  be worth 
accepting restrictions  on the then broad scope of bargaining  or the 
establishment of effective penalties against strikes (Barkley and Bur- 
gess interviews).  This stance had  been  taken earlier  by the Illinois 
Federation of  Teachers, when it helped kill the 1967 bargaining bill in 
Illinois because it banned strikes and authorized antistrike injunctions. 
In both states, AFSCME had more to gain than the teachers’ unions 
from the enactment of  a statute, mainly because many large units in 
their jurisdiction remained unorganized. (In Illinois the biggest unor- 
ganized groups were in municipal and county government, whereas in 
Ohio they were in state and county government.) AFSCME and Service 
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at the time the 1983  statute was enacted that an additional 80,000 or 
90,000 public  employees would  soon be bargaining.43 Similarly, one 
AFSCME official in Ohio estimated in 1980 that AFSCME’s member- 
ship in  Ohio would  rise from its then current 35,000 to 125,000 or 
150,000 within five years after a statute was enacted (Morgan inter- 
view). Nevertheless, in Ohio at least, AFSCME’s already established 
locals representing municipal employees in big cities opposed any leg- 
islation that would weaken their existing contracts. In both AFSCME 
and the teachers’ unions, established  locals,  being strong, wanted a 
bargaining statute only if  it was as favorable to unions as the NLRA. 
Thus, in  1977, when Governor Rhodes privately told  the Speaker of 
the Ohio House that he would sign a bargaining bill if certain weakening 
amendments were added, the governor was told  that the weakening 
amendments were not acceptable. 
There were, of course, unions that had trouble winning recognition 
without a  statute. One example was the Ohio Association  of Public 
School Employees (OAPSE), which represents nonteaching employees 
outside the major cities. One OEA official said that OAPSE would be 
glad to  take almost any collective bargaining law. But precisely because 
OAPSE was a weak union, it was unable to get the legislation it wanted. 
In  1983, however,  strong unions in both Ohio and Illinois pressed 
for legislation. Their motivations were somewhat different in each state. 
2.4.3  Illinois: Unfavorable Court Decisions Spurring Cooperation 
among Unions 
In Illinois, unions were jolted into action by threats to their estab- 
lished bargaining relationships. The building trades, for example, had 
long had “handshake agreements” with Chicago’s Mayor Daley. Dal- 
ey’s successors, however, did not honor these agreements as  faithfully 
as Daley had, so the building trades began  to see the need for real 
contracts (Gibson interview). An even greater jolt came in December 
1981  when the Illinois State Supreme Court issued two decisions af- 
fecting virtually all public employee unions. In the first case, Peters v. 
Cook County Health and Hospitals Governing Cornmissi~n,~~  the court 
ruled that public employers were free to withdraw recognition from a 
union  at any time. As one union  attorney put it, “Repudiation  of a 
bargaining relationship was old news in theory, but this was the first 
time that management  in a heavily  Democratic county actually exer- 
cised their power to end collective bargaining. It was a surprise that a 
friend of unions would do this to them”  (Carmell interview). In the 
second case, Chicago Board of Education v. Chicago Teuchers Union,4s 
the court ruled that a contract provision restricting layoffs was unen- 
forceable because layoffs were a management right granted to school 
boards by  the Illinois  School Code. The court suggested that some 
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According to another union attorney, these decisions threatened even 
established  public sector unions, thereby creating a greater sense of 
urgency about the need for a bargaining statute (D’Alba interview). 
Previous bills  in  Illinois  had  failed,  in  part, because of  divisions 
among the unions, some of which disagreed about the terms of the bills 
and some of which wanted no bill at all. A few months after these two 
state supreme court rulings, however, the president of the Illinois AFL- 
CIO began meeting with the leaders of various unions and their attor- 
neys in an effort to reach agreement on a common bill.  By October 
1982, they were meeting weekly, and they came up with a draft of a 
bill by December (Gibson interview). All the unions present agreed to 
refrain from lobbying for rival bills until after the legislature had made 
a decision on the common bill. 
AFSCME, which  had  the most to gain from a bill,  made the key 
concession in the interunion negotiations: there would be a historical 
unit  provision  to recognize the informal bargaining  relationships  es- 
tablished by the building trades. This protected the building trades from 
having their members included in larger bargaining units that AFSCME 
would probably win. In exchange, the building trades (which had pre- 
viously opposed public sector bargaining bills) sent not only their lob- 
byists, but also their local union presidents to tell the Illinois Assembly 
Speaker  and the Illinois Senate President that they supported the AFL- 
CIO bargaining bill (Carmell interview). 
The IEA was not part of the group that had agreed upon this common 
bill, perhaps because the IEAs  intense rivalry with the IFT  had strained 
the IEA’s relations with the state AFL-CIO. Early in  1983, however, 
the Illinois Assembly  Speaker informed the IEA and the IFT that a 
bargaining bill was likely to be enacted that session and that the IEA 
and the IFT would have to work together if they wanted to have any 
input (Blackshere interview). The IEA insisted on drafting a separate 
bill for educational employees (even though the AFL-CIO bill covering 
all public employees gave employees virtually the same rights), but the 
educational  bill  nevertheless had  terms acceptable to the IFT.  This 
IEA-IFT agreement marked a major departure from the past, when 
one teacher union  invariably opposed a teacher bargaining  bill  sup- 
ported by the other. IEA-IFT cooperation collapsed by the summer- 
when “traditional organized labor groups” urged Governor Thompson 
to veto the separate bill for education and let teacher bargaining  be 
regulated by the AFL-CIO’s bargaining bil14hbut  by then both bills 
had at least made it through the legislature. 
2.4.4  Ohio: Unified Democratic Party Control of State Government 
In Ohio, cooperation among unions had not been as great a problem, 
perhaps because the OEAs dominance in Ohio was more secure than 
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that feared the loss of members whom they had represented informally. 
The key development in Ohio was not an external threat that spurred 
union cooperation, but rather an unusually favorable political situation 
that allowed the unions to get what they wanted. The previous problem 
for unions  in  Ohio had  been that the Democratic party  had  rarely 
controlled  the state government, and the Republicans  generally op- 
posed bargaining legislation. The Democrats won the governorship  and 
majorities in both houses of the state legislature in the 1958 Democratic 
landslide, but public employee unions had too few members then to 
get anything more than the dues checkoff statute. Subsequently, more 
public employees became interested in  bargaining,  but  the political 
situation became unfavorable. From 1961  to 1982, the Republicans at 
all times controlled either the governorship or at least one house of the 
state legislature.  Bargaining  bills  were  either killed  in  Republican- 
controlled committees or  vetoed by Republican Governor Rhodes (who 
served as governor from 1963 to 1971  and again from 1975 to 1983). 
The Democrats made substantial  gains in  the legislature  after the 
1971 reapportionment, which was controlled by Democratic officials. 
(Warren Smith, the chief lobbyist for the Ohio AFL-CIO, estimated 
that the Democrats gained  six to seven seats in  the Senate (out of 
thirty-three) and fifteen seats in the House (out of ninety-nine) as a 
result of the reapportionment.) The Democrats won a majority in the 
Ohio  House of Representatives in  1973  and a  majority  in  the Ohio 
Senate in  1975. Unfortunately for the public employee unions, Gov- 
ernor Rhodes was back in office in 1975, and he vetoed their bargaining 
bills. The Democrats, however, controlled the reapportionment com- 
mission  again  in  1981, and  they  received  a further boost from the 
economic depression in Ohio in 1982. When the 1982 elections brought 
simultaneous Democratic control of the governorship and both houses 
of the legislature, Ohio’s public employee unions were finally able to 
get the strongly pro-union bargaining statute  upon which they insisted- 
even though not a single Republican voted for the bill. 
In Illinois, lack of Democratic party control had not been the key 
barrier to bargaining  legislation  prior to 1983: Republican  Governor 
Thompson was willing to sign bargaining legislation, and the Democrats 
controlled  both houses of the Illinois legislature from  1975  to 1980. 
Nevertheless, no bargaining bill acceptable to the unions would have 
emerged from a legislature like the one in office during 1981-82,  when 
several bills obnoxious to labor (a right-to-work bill, a bill to cut un- 
employment insurance and workers’ compensation benefits, and a bill 
to require one-year advance notice of strikes) were reported out of 
committee in  the  Republican-controlled  House.  The restoration of 
Democratic control of the House in the 1982 elections (partly due to 
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legislation possible again-once the unions presented  a united front 
and the mayor of Chicago no longer opposed a bill. 
2.5.  Impact of  the 1983 Statutes on the Extent of Bargaining 
Coverage and Nonwage Bargaining Outcomes 
Once the Ohio and Illinois bargaining statutes were enacted, what 
was their impact on public sector labor relations? Although the statutes 
may have affected many variables, the analysis here will focus on only 
two of  them: the extent of bargaining coverage and the nonwage out- 
comes of bargaining. 
Quantitative measurement of  the impact of  the Ohio law is difficult 
because detailed data for the years before the law was enacted are not 
available.  Thus, there  is  no baseline  against  which to measure any 
changes. A legislative study commission did, however, conduct a sur- 
vey of  local public employers and local public employee organizations 
in  Ohio during the fall of  1984, half  a year  after the Ohio law  took 
effect. Responses were obtained from about half of the employers and 
about a fourth of  the unions. Although the low response rates mean 
that these data cannot be used to make inferences about the proportion 
of all public employers or unions that would have given a particular 
answer, the data nevertheless  provide a (probably fairly low) lower 
bound estimate on the absolute number of employers or unions that 
would have given a particular answer. Results for selected questions 
are shown in table 2.  I. 
As table  2.1 indicates, the enactment of the  1983 Ohio bargaining 
law (S.B. 133) did not overcome all resistance to unions among public 
employers. Although 54 employers said that they recognized a union 
after S.B. 133 was passed but before it took effect, 80 said that they 
adopted  solicitation rules  (presumably intended to thwart union or- 
ganizing). Interestingly, 43  of  the 80 employers adopting solicitation 
rules were county governments, jurisdictions where Ohio’s public sec- 
tor unions had been especially weak before the law. When asked what 
proportion of their employees had to belong to the union before they 
would grant a fair-share (agency shop) clause, 434 employers (over half 
the sample) responded that they were ideologically opposed to a fair- 
share clause. Contracts were common at the time of the survey (514 
employers had them), but these contracts were in many cases fairly 
weak. For example, 153 of the employers responding to the survey said 
that their contracts did not have grievance arbitration.  Although the 
unions that did not have grievance arbitration (because they had either 
a weak contract or no contract at all) generally intended to bargain for 
it, employers not having grievance arbitration generally had no such 
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Table 2.1  Employer and Union Reactions to the 1983 Ohio Bargaining Law" 






As a result of the passage of Senate Bill  133, 
but prior to 1 April  1984, what changes in 
the workplace did you institute? (Please 
check all appropriate responses.) 
a) none 
b) work rule changes 
c)  job description changes 
d) supervisor identification 
e) recognition of union 
f)  adoption of solicitation rules 
g) offer to renegotiate existing contract 
h) management training in labor relations 
i) other 
Do you have a union membership 
percentage threshold as a determining factor 
before granting a fair-share [agency shop] 
clause? 
a) 50 -  59 percent 
b) over 70 percent 
c) ideologically opposed to a fair-share 
d) no response 
Do you have a collective bargaining 
agreement in your unit or units? 
a) yes 
b) no 
c) no response 
Does your agreement contain a grievance 




c) no response 
Do you intend to bargain for a grievance 






































306  146 
153  49 
323  74 
43  95 
214  10 
525  164 
"Tabulated from data collected during the fall of 1984 by the Public Employment Advisory 
and Counseling Effort (PEACE) Commission, a study commission created by  the Ohio 
legislature to review the implementation of  S.B.  133. The PEACE Commission sent 
questionnaires to approximately 1,675 local  public employers in Ohio and  1,200 local 
employee organizations; 782 employers and 269 employee organizations responded. The 
data in the table indicate the absolute number of employers or unions giving each response. 61  Public Sector Bargaining Laws Really  Matter 
I supplemented the data obtained from this survey with information 
obtained from interviews with practitioners. The most interesting find- 
ing from these interviews is that some public employers in Ohio have 
aggressively resisted the unionization of their employees, even after 
the legislature enacted a bargaining law. This represents a radical break 
with the previous pattern established by public employers in states that 
enacted bargaining laws during the 1960s and 1970s. In that era, public 
employers (unlike their private sector counterparts) did not oppose the 
unionization of their employees once the legislature declared that it 
was the policy of the state to protect the right of employees to organize 
and bargain. Instead, management anti-unionism in the public sector 
was manifested in disputes about the scope of bargaining. These latter 
disputes are not absent from Ohio: for example, the City of Cincinnati 
and the Fraternal Order of Police had a fierce dispute about whether 
residency requirements were bargai~~able.~’  What is new is employer 
campaigning against union representation. 
According to one attorney I interviewed, labor relations consulting 
firms began,  shortly before S.B. 133 was enacted, to market their 
services by conducting seminars explaining why employers would find 
it advantageous to remain nonunion. Furthermore, the Association of 
County Commissioners and the Ohio Municipal League, dismayed that 
the bill was enacted, also allegedly promoted the idea of staying non- 
union. A number of local public employers responded by hiring con- 
sulting firms to help them defeat unions in  representation elections. 
Most notable  was the case of  the welfare  department in  Hamilton 
County (the county in which Cincinnati is located). This department, 
several people told me, paid a consulting firm over a quarter  of a million 
dollars to help fight a union-organizing drive during 1983 and 1984, plus 
substantial additional sums for the legal battles that have followed. 
The history of this organizing drive is described in the report of the 
State Employment Relations Board (SERB)  hearing officer on an unfair 
labor practice charge that the union  eventually  filed.48 According  to 
the report, the Hamilton County Welfare Department did not bargain 
with AFSCME prior to S.B. 133, but it did provide dues checkoff. A 
substantial number of  the employees had  signed the dues deduction 
authorizations, providing a strong base for the organizing drive that 
AFSCME began in the late spring of 1983 (once it was clear that S.B. 
133  would  be enacted). The director of the welfare  department re- 
sponded by holding meetings  with the managers and first-line super- 
visors to enlist their support for a campaign to oppose unionization. 
In the fall of 1983, the welfare department hired a labor relations con- 
sulting firm to provide assistance in resisting unionization. 
Shortly after hiring the consulting firm, the SERB hearing officer’s 
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literature or authorization  cards on the department’s premises, even 
by department employees, and required prior approval before depart- 
ment employees could post notices on the departmental bulletin boards. 
This policy was relaxed in March 1984 (just before S.B. 133 took effect) 
to permit solicitation by employees during nonworking time; but so- 
licitation  was banned  during working time  and  nonemployees were 
prohibited from entering the building. The department continued, how- 
ever, to give unlimited  access to the outside consultants, who cam- 
paigned among the employees during the employees’ working time. 
Meanwhile, supervisors used the regular weekly meetings with their 
subordinates, at which attendance was required, to pass out the em- 
ployer’s representation campaign literature and to discuss election is- 
sues.  During  the  two  days  immediately  before  the  representation 
election, the department held a series of meetings for all employees at 
which one of the outside consultants expressed the employer’s views 
on union  representation. The notice  of  the meeting,  signed by  the 
director of the welfare department, stated, “If  you cannot make the 
assigned meeting, please arrange to attend one of the other sessions,” 
which created an impression among some employees that attendance 
was required.49 
On 11 July 1984, the representation election was held. AFSCME lost 
by the narrowest of margins:  355 votes for no representation vs. 354 
for AFSCME. AFSCME filed an unfair labor practice charge and sought 
a new election. On 6 February 1986, the SERB hearing officer agreed 
with the union position on the grounds that the employer’s solicitation- 
distribution rules were unduly restrictive and that the meetings during 
which supervisors and the outside consultant campaigned against the 
union involved illegal “captive audience” speeches. The three SERB 
board members unanimously adopted the hearing officer’s recommen- 
dation on 12 May  1986, directing that a new election take place; but 
the Hamilton County Welfare Department challenged the SERB ruling 
in court. 
On 7 July 1986, the Hamilton County Welfare Department’s appeal 
of the SERB ruling was dismissed in county court. Two days later, the 
AFSCME local chapter president (an employee of the welfare depart- 
ment) requested that a union announcement, printed on 8-1/2“ by  11” 
paper, be posted on welfare department bulletin boards. (See p. 63.) 
The welfare department personnel  director,  however,  sent the local 
chapter president  a memo the following day denying the request to 
post the notice.50 Thus, the battle  over union  representation in  the 
Hamilton County Welfare Department continues. Some experienced 
practitioners familiar with both this case and private sector labor re- 
lations told me that Hamilton County’s resistance to unionization was 
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of the Hamilton County battle is that most of the welfare department’s 
labor costs are reimbursed  by the state and federal governments, so 
that unionization poses less of a threat to the welfare department man- 
agement than it does to most employers. 
Despite this and other cases of management resistance, unions have 
made considerable gains in winning representation rights in Ohio. The 
biggest change has come in state government. Before S.B. 133, there 
had been some “members only” contracts in state government. Indeed, 
Ohio State University had such contracts with two separate unions for 
a single classification of employees. These “members only” contracts 
were, however, generally much more limited in scope than a conven- 
tional contract negotiated by an exclusive bargaining agent, if only to 
avoid inconsistency in the personnel policies applying to members and 
nonmembers. Exclusive representation contracts, meanwhile, were al- 
most nonexistent in state government in Ohio (the exceptions were one 
in a home for old sailors and soldiers, and one in a home for the blind). 
In the aftermath of S.B. 133, however, AFSCME and other unions 
very quickly won exclusive bargaining rights for all state employees 
covered by  the new law. The SERB divided  the covered state em- 
ployees  into fourteen statewide  bargaining  units  on 25  March  1985. 
Within  five weeks, unions  gathered  enough  employee signatures  to 
petition for representation elections in thirteen of the fourteen units, 
including  two where unions  might  have  been  expected to be weak 
(clerical workers and administrative professionals). The fourteenth unit, 
state engineers and scientists, was another one that might not be ex- 
pected to be a union stronghold, but a representation petition for that 
unit was filed within four months of the SERB unit determination ruling.5’ 
Unions prevailed over the “no representation” option in all fourteen 
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speed of these union victories  and the inclusion among them of  the 
units for clerical workers, administrative professionals, and engineers 
and  scientists contrasts with  the experience of  other states, where 
unionization of the blue-collar employees and the negotiation of  one 
or more blue-collar contracts typically preceded any organizing among 
clerical workers or professionals. Clearly, there was a pent-up demand 
for union  representation  among  state employees in  Ohio.  It  took  a 
bargaining statute for that demand to be satisfied. 
In Illinois, quantitative assessment of the impact of  the  1983  bar- 
gaining legislation is  more  easily done than  it  is in  Ohio, primarily 
because the Illinois State Board of Education has been collecting data 
on labor agreements in the public schools since the early  1970s. The 
state board  obtains copies of  all  signed agreements between  school 
boards and  teacher  unions and records  the presence  or absence  of 
various contract provisions. The board summarizes these data in annual 
pamphlets and also produces data tapes with detailed information for 
each school district. Copies of these tapes were obtained for this study. 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics on the prevalence of  signed 
written agreements between Illinois public school boards and teacher 
organizations. Several trends stand out: 
(I)  Agreements were much more common in  large school districts 
(those with large enrollments and, hence, a large number of teach- 
ers) than  in  small school  districts.  For  example,  in  1979-80, 
signed written agreements were in  effect in  only  15  percent of 
the  districts  with  enrollments under  500 (which typically  had 
thirty or fewer teachers) but in  over 90 percent of  the districts 
with enrollments over 3,000 (which typically had  150 or more 
teachers. 
(2) The percentage of  smaller districts with agreements rose only 
slightly during the four years from 1979-80  to 1983-84. 
(3) The percentage of smaller districts with agreements jumped dra- 
matically in  1984-85,  the first school year after the 1983 Illinois 
bargaining law took effect. For example, the fraction of districts 
having contracts in the under 500 enrollment stratum grew from 
15 percent in 1979-80  to only 19 percent in 1983-84,  but it then 
jumped to 56 percent in  1984-85. 
Clearly, these data suggest that employer size and legislation both in- 
fluence whether teachers in a given district are covered by an agreement. 
More rigorous evidence of the importance of  these factors is pre- 
sented in tables 2.3 and 2.4, which show logistic regressions aimed at 
explaining the presence  of  a  substantive contract in  Illinois school 
districts. (Some of the agreements included in table 2.2 were “proce- 
dural agreements”  in  which the school board  merely recognized the 
teacher organization and agreed to negotiate with it, rather than formal Table 2.2  Percent of Illinois School Districts with Negotiated Agreements, 1979-80  to 1986-87' 
District Enrollment 
Year  Under 500  500-999  1,000-2,999  3,000-5,999  6,000-11,999  12,000  and Above 
1979-80  15%  35%  69%  93%  91%  100% 
1980- 8 1  15%  40%  71%  95%  90%  92%b 
1981-82  19%  42%  74%  95%  90%  100% 
1982-83  18%  46%  76%  94%  89%  92%b 
1983-84  19%  48%  78%  96%  87%  100% 
1984-85  56%  83%  93%  97%  100%  100% 
1985  -86  61%  87%  96%  97%  100%  100% 
"Data taken from Department of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, Illinois State Board of Education, IIIinois 
Teacher Salary Srudy [title varies], annual editions for 1979-80  to 1985-86. 
bThe changes in the percentage with contracts in  the largest enrollment stratum represent the Peoria School 
District. In  1979-80  and again in  1981-82,  the Peoria School District was reported as having a signed written 
agreement with  a coordinating council consisting of  representatives of  the NEA, the AFT, and independent 
teachers.  In  1980-81,  the Peoria School District was reported as developing its salary schedules by meetings 
between board representatives and representatives of  a teacher organization recognized through board policy. 
In  1982-83,  the Peoria salary schedule was reported developed on the basis of meetings between the school 
board and the superintendent. From 1983-84  onward, the Peoria board was reported as having a signed written 
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collective bargaining contracts.) The regressions are based on Illinois 
State Board of Education data for individual school districts, to which 
I have added county data on the vote for Reagan in the 1984 presidential 
election. In both tables, the dependent variable was coded as 1 if  the 
school district had a substantive contract, 0 otherwise. 
Table 2.3 presents a cross-section estimate of the probability of the 
presence of  a collective bargaining contract in each school district in 
the fall of  1982 (before the teacher bargaining  law was passed). The 
results were generally as expected. Thus, districts with a small number 
of teachers (particularly  those with  20  or fewer) were  less likely to 
have contracts, while districts with more than 500 teachers were more 
likely to have contracts. (This confirms the results in table 2.2 even 
when there are controls for other variables that are highly correlated 
with district size, such as whether it is an elementary district, a sec- 
ondary district, or a unit district.) Rural districts were less likely to 
have  contracts, as were districts  located  outside Cook County. The 
only surprise was that the probability of a contract was higher in dis- 
tricts located in counties which voted heavily for Reagan in  198La 
result that probably arose because of the high zero-order correlation 
between the variables COOKCOUNTY and REAGANVOTE ( -  0.56). 
In  any  case,  the  coefficient  for  REAGANVOTE  was  statistically 
insignificant. 
Table 2.4 presents an estimate of the probability of a change from 
nonunion  status to union  status. Specifically, the regression in table 
2.4 estimates the probability that districts without collective bargaining 
contracts in the prior year would have collective bargaining contracts 
in the current year. Data are included for three years: the fall of 1982 
(before the bargaining law was passed), the fall of  1983 (after it was 
passed but before it took effect), and the fall of 1984 (after it had taken 
effect). The regression includes dummy variables for year, which are 
proxies for the impact of the law on districts that previously did not 
have contracts. 
The results in table 2.4 differ somewhat from those in table 2.3.  In 
table 2.4, unlike table 2.3, the size of the district and its rural or urban 
status has a statistically insignificant effect on the probability that the 
district would sign its first contract. This may suggest that the enact- 
ment of bargaining legislation in 1983 reduced the degree to which small 
unit sizes and location in rural areas posed a barrier to unionization. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient for COOKCOUNTY, which is positive and 
significant in table 2.3, is negative and significant in table 2.4. Perhaps 
the districts in Cook County that had not signed contracts prior to 1982 
were hard-core nonunion districts for some reasons not controlled for 
in my model (e.g., enlightened personnel practices that keep a district’s 
employees content). The negative coefficient for COOKCOUNTY in Table 2.3  Determinants of Contract Coverage in Illinois Public Schools Prior to the 
1983 Bargaining Laws 
Dependent  Variable: Probability of a collective 
bargaining contract in this school district in the fall 





Coefficient  (Standard Error)  Variableb 
Characteristics of  the District 
Dummy variables for the number 
of  teachers in the district:c 
20 or fewer (DISTZO)  -  1.358***  (0.173)  -  0.330 
21  to 50 (DISTSO)  -0.896"'  (0.131)  -0.218 
5  1 to 100 (DISTIOO)  -0.343"  (0.132)  -  0.083 
500 or more (DISTSOO)  0.499  (0.568)  0.121 
Dummy variables for the student 
population served by the 
district:d 
elementary (ELEMDIST)  0.026 
secondary (SECONDIST)  0.163 
rural status of the district? 
central city (CENTRALCITY)  0.416 
independent city (SMALLCITY)  0.357** 
Dummy variables for the urban or 











0.119  (0.167) 
Characteristics of the County 
Dummy variable for districts in 
Cook County  0.488" 
(COOKCOUNTY) 
Fraction of the county vote for 
President in  1984 for Reagan 
(REAGANVOTE)  0.615  (1.094)  0.150 
Intercept  -  0.588  (0.873)  -0.143 
-  2*LLR  I004 
"Logistic regressions  based  on data obtained from the Illnois State Board of  Education on 
contract provisions in Illinois public school districts. There is one observation for the fall of 
1982 for each school district. There are 1,013 observations, 424 of which represent districts 
with collective bargaining contracts. The dependent variable is coded  1 for districts with sub- 
stantive contracts, 0 otherwise. 
hThis is the partial derivative of the logit equation with respect to the explanatory variable, 
evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable. It equals b*p*(l  -p), where b is the coefficient 
of the explanatory variable and p is the proportion of 1's for the dependent variable (42 percent). 
CThe  omitted category represents districts with  101 to 499 teachers. 
dThe omitted  category represents unit  districts which have both elementary and secondary 
schools. 
eThe omitted category represents rural school districts. 
"Significant  at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
***Significant  at the 0.1 percent level (two-tailed test). Table 2.4  The Impact of the 1983 Bargaining Law on the Spread of  Bargaining in 
Illinois Public Schoolsa 
Dependent Variable: Probability that a district that did 
not have a collective bargaining contract the previous 
fall will have one this fall (fall 1982, 1983, 1984) 
Impact at Mean 
of Dependent 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  (Standard Error)  Variableb 
Bargaining Law 
Dummy variables for the year: 
1 984 -  85 (LAWEFFECT  YR) 
1983-84  (LAWPASSYR) 
Characteristics of  the Districr 
Dummy variables for the number 
of teachers in the district:c 
20 or fewer (DIST2O) 
21  to 50 (DIST5O) 
51 to 100 (DISTIOO) 
500 or more (DISTSOO) 




Dummy variables for the urban or 
rural status of the district? 
central city (CENTRALCITY) 
suburb (SUBURB) 
independent city (SMALLCITY) 
Dummy variables for the student 
Characteristics of  the Counry 
Dummy variables for districts in 
Cook County 
(COOKCO  UNT  Yj 
Fraction of the county vote for 
President in 1984 for Reagan 
(REAGANVOTE) 
Intercept 
-  2*LLR 
2.353"'  (0.203)  0.321 













-0.286'  (0.120)  -0.039 
0.212  (0.156)  0.029 
0.679  (0.986)  0.092 
0.226  (0.141)  0.03 I 
0.293  (0.165)  0.040 
-  0.720"  (0.270)  -  0.098 
1.351  (I.  179)  0.184 
-  0.706  (1.090)  -  0.096 
884 
"Logistic regressions based on data obtained from the Illinois State Board of  Education on 
contract provisions in Illinois public school districts. The data consist of observations for each 
of three years (1982-83,  1983-84,  and 1984-85),  with one observation for each school district 
that did not have a collective bargaining contract in the prior year. Thus, all the observations 
represent school districts that either did not have contracts in the given year or negotiated their 
first contract in that year. There are a total of  1,727 observations, 281 of which were for first 
contracts. The dependent variable is coded  1 for districts with substantive contracts, 0 otherwise. 
This is the partial derivative of the logit equation with respect to the explanatory variable, 
evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable. See note b to table 2.3. 
'The  omitted category represents districts with  101 to 499 teachers. 
dThe omitted category represents  unit  districts which have both  elementary and  secondary 
schools. 
eThe omitted category represents rural school districts. 
'Significant  at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
"Significant  at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
"'Significant  at the 0. I  percent level (two-tailed test). 69  Public Sector Bargaining Laws Really Matter 
table 2.4  could thus reflect the impact of these omitted variables, which 
are the true reasons for the absence of bargaining. 
The major finding from the regression in table 2.4 is that, even con- 
trolling for characteristics of the county and characteristics of the school 
district that might influence whether the district would have a teacher 
bargaining contract, the 1983 bargaining law brought a notable increase 
in the subsequent probability of contract coverage. The knowledge that 
the law would soon be in effect may have brought a small increase in 
bargaining coverage, as indicated by the positive coefficient (significant 
at the 5.3 percent level) for the variable LAWPASSYR (a dummy vari- 
able for school years  1983-84).  Much more dramatically, the increase 
came once the bargaining law took effect, as indicated by the positive 
and  statistically  highly  significant coefficient for the variable  LAW- 
EFFECTYR (a dummy variable for school year  1984-85).  Moreover, 
the magnitude of the coefficient for LAWEFFECTYR was large-larger 
than that for any of the other explanatory variables. If the other vari- 
ables were at their average values, then the probability that a school 
district would have a contract was 40 percentage points higher in 1984- 
85 than in 1982-83.52 By contrast, the nonlegal variable with the great- 
est impact was DIST5OO  (a dummy variable for districts with 500 or 
more teachers), and its effect on the probability of a contract was less 
than 20 percentage points. Similarly, the “impact”  column in table 2.4 
(which reports the partial derivative of the logit function with respect 
to the  explanatory variable) indicates that  the law  taking effect  in- 
creased the probability of a contract by 32 percentage points, whereas 
DISTSOO had an impact of only 17.5 percentage points. 
In short, one can be confident that the association between legislation 
and subsequent increases in contract coverage is real, and it is large 
enough to be socially important. These results (based on district level 
data for one state) confirm those reported in  Saltzman’s (1985) study, 
which used aggregate statewide data for all fifty states. Obviously, this 
confirmation with a different data set strengthens the finding. 
Does this association between bargaining legislation and subsequent 
increases in  contract coverage demonstrate a causal relationship? In 
the 1960s and early  1970s, one could argue that bargaining laws were 
consequences of  the same social forces that led to unionization and 
not an independent cause. By  1983, however, the social forces gen- 
erating the tidal wave of  public employee unionism had receded.  As 
the legislative histories given earlier in  this chapter make clear, the 
Illinois and Ohio bargaining laws were enacted in  1983 not because of 
a surge in public employee militancy, but because of exogenous political 
events, such as the breakdown of the Chicago Democratic machine. 
Moreover, as table 2.2 indicates, in  the four years before the Illinois 
law, there was only a minor increase in  the number of  Illinois school 
districts with contracts. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the 70  Gregory M. Saltzman 
substantial increase in bargaining coverage after the 1983 laws was a 
consequence of the laws per  se. Certainly that was the view  of the 
union lobbyists I interviewed, who gave as one rationale for their pur- 
suit of legislation that it would help them win representation rights for 
additional employees. Thus, as a cause of the growth  of bargaining 
coverage, public sector bargaining laws really matter. 
Besides contributing to the spread of  bargaining,  bargaining  legis- 
lation could also affect bargaining outcomes. There are two reasons 
why one would expect that the 1983 teacher law in Illinois should lead 
to outcomes more favorable to unions. First, the teacher law required 
that all contracts have binding grievance arbitration. (This was one of 
the few respects in which the amended version of H.B. 1530 differed 
from the comprehensive law, S.B. 536, which merely authorized griev- 
ance arbitration.) Second, it explicitly legalized teacher strikes, which 
should have helped unions win favorable contract terms on all issues, 
even in cases where the union merely threatens to strike. 
A different sample of the same data set used to analyze the spread 
of bargaining was used to analyze the impact of legislation on contract 
terms. The contract terms sample was based on one observation per 
contract. Thus, districts with no collective bargaining contracts during 
the period from 1982-83  to 1984-85  were not included in the sample. 
On the other hand, districts with  two or more contracts during this 
period were represented by multiple observations. The contract data 
set used is unusual in having information on contract expiration dates, 
which made it possible to distinguish records for renegotiated contracts 
from those for continuations of multiyear contracts. 
Table 2.5 uses this sample of the data set to estimate how much of 
an effect the law actually had on contract terms. The table presents 
logistic regressions indicating the probability that various contract terms 
will be present in those cases where there are contracts. These contract 
terms, each corresponding to a separate regression equation, are: (a) 
grievance arbitration, (b) fair share, (c) class size limits, and (d) se- 
niority for reductions in force (RIFs). 
The results  in  table 2.5  indicate that the  1983 bargaining  law did, 
indeed, lead to contracts more favorable to unions. The law had its 
greatest impact on the probability that contracts would include griev- 
ance arbitration, which  might  be expected since the law  specifically 
required the inclusion of this contract provision. In quantitative terms, 
the probability  that contracts included grievance  arbitration  was 41 
percentage  points higher  in  1984-85  than in  1982-83  (assuming that 
the other variables are at their average values). The law also increased 
the probability of fair-share clauses and the use of seniority as  the basis 
for determining  who gets laid  off  during a  RIF,  although  it  had  no 
significant impact on the probability of class size limits. Table 2.5  The Impact of the 1983 Bargaining Law on Contract Language in Illinois Public School 
Bargaining. 
Probability That the Contract Will Contain: 
Grievance Arbitration  Fair Share 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  (Standard Error)  Coefficient  (Standard Error) 
Bargaining Law 
Dummy variables for the year: 
1984- 85 (LAWEFFECT  YR) 
I983 -  84 (LAWPASS  YR) 
Characteristics of the Bargaining 
Relationship 
Dummy variable for 
representation 
by the AFT (AFT) 
Dummy variable for first 
contracts (FIRSTK) 
Characteristics of the District 
Dummy variables for the number 
of teachers in the district:b 
20 or fewer (DlSnO) 
21  to 50 (DIST5O) 
51 to 100 (DfSTl00) 
500  or more (DISTSOO) 




Dummy variables for the urban or 
rural status of the district:d 
central city (CENTRALCITY) 
suburb (SUBURB) 
independent city (SMALLCITY) 
Dummy variables for the student 
(continued) 
2.223'*'  (0.149) 
0. I15  (0.089) 
-0.173  (0.1  16) 
0.261  (0.155) 
-0.908""'  (0.192) 
-0.584***  (0.120) 
-0.368'**  (0.102) 
0.179  (0.290) 
0.038  (0.117) 
-0.067  (0.130) 
0.992"  (0.337) 
0.419"  (0.141) 

























(0.  I7  I) 
(0.174) Table 2.5  (continued) 
Probability That the Contract Will Contain: 
Grievance Arbitration  Fair Share 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  (Standard Error)  Coefficient  (Standard Error) 
Characteristics of  the County 
Dummy variable for districts in 
Cook County (COOKCOUNTY)  0.590"'  (0.146)  0.336  (0.194) 
Fraction of the county vote for 
President in 1984 for Reagan 
(REAGAN  VOTE)  -  2.009  (1.163)  -2.070  (I  ,533) 
Intercept  -  1.012  (0.761)  2.190'  (0.97  1 ) 
~  2*LLR  1045  698 
Class Size Limits  Seniority for RIFs 
Coefficient  (Standard Error)  Coefficient  (Standard Error) 
Bargaining Law 
Dummy variables for the year: 
1984-85  (LAWEFFECTYR)  0.048  (0.081)  0.284"'  (0.077) 
1983 -84  (LAWPASS  YR)  -0.009  (0.089)  0.103  (0.084) 
Characteristics of the Bargaining 
Relationship 
Dummy variable for represen- 
tation by the AFT (AFT) 
Dummy variable for first 
contracts (FIRSTK) 
Characteristics of  the District 
Dummy variables for the number 
of teachers in the district:b 
20 or fewer (DlSn0) 
21 to 50 (DIST50) 
0.078 
-0.447"' 
-  1.517"' 
-  0.881"' 
(0.098)  0.127  (0.091) 
(0.118)  -0.106  (0.087) 
(0.205)  -0.826"'  (0.135) 
(0.104)  -0.741"'  (0.096) 51 to  100 (DISTIOO) 
500 or more (DISTSOO) 




Dummy variables for the urban or 
rural status of the district:d 
central city (CENTRALCITY) 
suburb (SUBURB) 
independent city (SMALLCITY) 
Dummy variables for the student 
Characteristics of  the County 
Dummy variable for districts in 
Cook  County (COOKCOUNTY) 
Fraction of the county vote for 
President in  1984 for Reagan 
(REAGAN  VOTE) 
Intercept 



















(I  .009) 
(0.667) 
1377 





















"Logistic regressions based on data obtained from the Illinois State Board of Education on contract provisions 
in Illinois public school districts. There is one observation for each contract reported during 1982-83,  1983- 
84, or 1984-85 (a total of 1,329). Districts with three contracts  during this period thus have three observations, 
while districts with no contracts are excluded from the regressions. The dependent variable is coded as 1 for 
contracts where the contract provision is  present, 0 otherwise. The number of contracts containing each 
provision is as  follows: grievance arbitration, 828 (out of 1,329);  fair share (a public sector term for the agency 
shop), 129; class size limits, 412; seniority for RIFs, 743. 
bThe omitted category represents districts with 101 to 499 teachers. 
=The  omitted category represents unit districts which have both elementary and secondary schools. 
dThe  omitted category represents rural school districts. 
'Significant  at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
"Significant  at the  I  percent level (two-tailed test). 
"'Significant  at the 0.1 percent level (two-tailed test). 74  Gregory M. Saltzman 
The one case where a significant effect appeared during the 1983- 
84  year was  fair share (as indicated  by  the positive  and  significant 
coefficient for LAWPASSYR), but this effect is subject to two possible 
interpretations. It might be  that knowledge that the  1983  bill  would 
soon go into effect led to  the spread of fair-share clauses at the beginning 
of the 1983-84  school year. (Most school district contracts are signed 
and ratified  shortly after the teachers return from summer vacation. 
The 1983  law,  originally passed by  the legislature in June  1983  and 
signed by the governor in  September, went into effect on 1  January 
1984.) Alternatively, the spread of fair-share clauses during 1983-84 
could reflect the delayed impact of H.B. 701, the bill passed in  1981 
that specifically authorized school districts to agree to fair-share clauses. 
In either case, legislation appears to be an important determinant of 
bargaining outcomes. 
Of the other explanatory variables in  table 2.5, perhaps the most 
interesting is AFT, a dummy  variable  indicating that the teachers in 
that school district were represented by the AFT rather than the NEA 
or an independent organization. (The independent organizations were 
rare, so that the comparison is primarily  between  the AFT and the 
NEA.) Although the coefficients for AFT were positive in three out of 
four cases, they were all statistically insignificant. This suggests that, 
controlling for other determinants of bargaining  outcomes, teachers’ 
choice between the AFT and the NEA had little effect on the contract 
language they won (at least concerning grievance arbitration,  fair share, 
class size limits, and seniority for RIFs). The existence of rival union- 
ism may have substantially affected bargaining outcomes (by spurring 
both the AFT and the NEA to be more aggressive), but these regres- 
sions tend to undermine claims that one teacher union is systematically 
more successful than the other. 
2.6  Conclusions 
The findings in this study suggest that major political changes-the 
overthrow of the Chicago Democratic machine  in  Illinois,  the  1983 
Democratic triumph in Ohio-may  be the prerequisite for the enact- 
ment of new public sector bargaining laws in the 1980s. If such political 
changes occur, then some states in  the South or Rocky  Mountains 
might give their employees the right to bargain, or the federal govern- 
ment might  enact a bargaining  statute for state and local public em- 
ployees similar to the ones proposed in the mid-1970s. Such legislation 
would likely bring substantial growth in the extent of  bargaining cov- 
erage, even though resistance by public employers to unionization may 
become more common; and (depending on the terms of the legislation) 
it might also lead to contracts more favorable to unions. As noted at 75  Public Sector Bargaining Laws Really Matter 
the beginning  of  this  chapter, however,  Ohio and Illinois  had  been 
“exceptional” cases prior to the enactment of  their laws in  1983. La- 
bor’s prospects today of  winning similar pro-union bargaining legisla- 
tion  in the remaining  states that lack it  are probably  not  nearly  so 
bright. 
Notes 
I. See, however, the quantitative studies by Kochan (1973) and Saltzman 
(1983, and the case study of bargaining legislation in Wisconsin by Saltzman 
(  1986). 
2.  147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E. 2d 246 (1974). 
3. Ohio Revised Code 00 41 17.01-.05. 
4. H.B. 92 (1947 Ohio House Journal  120, 1303) and S.B.  114 (1947 Ohio 
Senate Journal  116). S.B. 114, incidentally, was introduced by Howard Metz- 
enbaum, who subsequently became a United States Senator. 
5. H.B. 5, passage by the House reported in 1947 Ohio House Journal 206-7. 
6. H.B. 36,  passage  by the House reported in  1947 Ohio House Journal 
7.  1947 Ohio Senate Journal  1086-87. 
8. S.B. 209, enacted as 0  1321.321, later renumbered as 5  9.41 of the Ohio 
Revised Code (128 Laws of  Ohio 260 [1959]. 
9.  Ohio Legislative Service Commission, “Public  Employee Labor Rela- 
tions,”  Staff Research Report no. 96, Columbus, Ohio, February 1968, 28. 
10. Government Employee Relations Report (hereafter cited as GERR),  no. 
176, 23 January 1967, B-8. 
11. GERR, no. 286, 3 March 1969, B-8. 
12. GERR, no. 287, 10  March  1969, B-7. 
13. GERR, no. 221, 4 December 1967, B-7. 
14. GERR, no.  175, 16 January 1967, B-7. The bill was numbered S.B. 30. 
15. GERR, no. 179, 13 February 1967, B-5. 
16. GERR, no. 74, 8 February  1965, B-2. 
17. GERR, no. 196, 12 June 1967, B-6; GERR, no. 197, 19 June 1967, B-8. 
18. GERR, no. 222,  11 December 1967, B-8. 
19. 1968 Ohio House Journal 2219. 
20. GERR, no. 215, 23 October 1967, B-7. 
21. GERR, no. 329, 29 December 1969, B-8. 
22. 41 Ohio St. 2d  127, 323 N.E. 2d 714 (1975). 
23. Ohio Revised Code  li  41 17.08(A). 
24.  1983 Ohio Laws 140; Ohio Revised Code 0 4117. 
25. Legislative Synopsis andDigest (Springfield, 111.:  State of Illinois, 30 June 
26.  127 Ill. App. 3d 328, 468 N.E. 2d  1268 (1966). 
27. GERR, no. 522, 24 September 1973, B-5 to B-7. 
28. GERR, no. 820, 23 July 1979, 16. 
29. GERR, no. 846, 28 January 1980, 20. 
30. GERR, no. 848,  11 February 1980, 20-21. 
31. GERR, no. 853, 17 March  1980, 27-28. 
207-9. 
1945), 176. 76  Gregory M. Saltzman 
32. GERR, no. 920, 13 July 1981, 23-24. 
33. 1973 Laws of Illinois, 78th General Assembly  1:632-33. 
34. 1981  Laws of Illinois, 81st General Assembly  1:789-93. 
35. Enacted as chapter 48, paragraphs  1701-21,  Ill. Stats. Anno. 
36. Enacted as chapter 48, paragraphs  1601-27,  Ill. Stats. Anno. 
37. 1985 Laws of Illinois, 84th General Assembly 3:6517. 
38. 1985 Laws of Illinois, 84th General Assembly 3:7335. 
39. Focus  11, no. 6 (May 1977):4. 
40. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
41. 481  F. Supp. 315 (1979). 
42. S.B. 1387, introduced  11 April 1979. A copy of the bill is available in the 
43. GERR 21, no.  1032, 3 October 1983, 1955. 
44. 430 N.E. 2d  I I28 (1981). 
45. 430N.E.  2d  1111 (1981). 
46. GERR 21, no.  1032, 3 October 1983, 1954. 
47. Paul  Furiga, “Cincinnati  Using Bargaining Law in Police Strike,”  Cin- 
cinnati Enquirer, 6 January 1985, A-1 and A-16. 
48. “Hearing Officer’s Recommended Determination,”  Ohio  Civil Service 
Employees Association (OCSEA)  Local  I I  v. Hamilton County  Welfare De- 
partment, Ohio State Employment Relations Board, Case no. 84-RC-04-0080, 
6 February 1986. 
49. Ibid., 9. 
50. “Motion to Expedite,” OCSEA Local 11 v. Hamilton County Department 
of  Human Services, Ohio State Employment Relations Board, filed 21  July 
1986. 
Illinois State Library in Springfield. 
51. GERR 24, no.  1145, 6 January 1986, 11-12. 
52. Since the logit model is nonlinear, the impact on the dependent variable 




Burton, John. 1979. The extent of  collective bargaining in the public sector. 
In Public sector bargaining, ed. Benjamin Aaron, Joseph Grodin, and James 
L. Stern, 1-43.  Washington, D.C.:  Bureau of National Affairs. 
Clark, R. Theodore. 1969. Public employee labor legislation: A study of the 
unsuccessful  attempt to enact a public  employment bargaining  statute in 
Illinois.  Labor Luw Journal 20: 164-73. 
Derber, Milton.  1968. Labor-management policy for public employees in Illi- 
nois: The experience of the Governor’s Commission. Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 21541  -58. 
Kochan, Thomas. 1973. Correlates of state public employee bargaining laws. 
Industrial Relations  12(3):322-37. 
Saltzman, Gregory. 1985. Bargaining laws as a cause and consequence of the 
growth of teacher unionism. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 38:335- 
51. 
-.  1986. A progressive experiment: The evolution of  Wisconsin’s collec- 
tive bargaining legislation for local government employees. Journal of  Col- 
lective Negotiations in  the Public Sector 15: 1-24. 77  Public Sector Bargaining Laws Really Matter 
Wagner, Martin, et al.  1967. Report and recommendations of  the Governor’s 
Advisory Commission on Labor-Management Policy for Public Employees. 
Reprinted  in  Government Employee Relations Report, no.  184, 20 March 
1967, D-1 to D-27. 
INTERVIEWS  WITH AUTHOR 
Note: Some interviews listed below were on a “not for attribution” basis and, 
hence, are not cited in the text. 
Arcilesi, Len (president, Cincinnati Teacher’s Association, 1966-69; president, 
Ohio Education Association,  1972-74).  Cincinnati, Ohio, 26 June 1980. 
Barkley, Bob (supervisor of  UniServ staff, Ohio Education Association). Co- 
lumbus, Ohio, 24 June 1980. 
Bedgood,  Terry  (labor  advisor  to  Illinois  Governor Thompson). Chicago, 
9 December  1985. 
Blackshere,  Margaret  (lobbyist,  Illinois  Federation  of  Teachers).  Chicago, 
9 December  1985. 
Booth, Paul (AFSCME international union area director for Illinois). Chicago, 
10 December  1985. 
Brandt, John (associate director for labor relations, Ohio School Boards As- 
sociation). Columbus, Ohio, 25 June 1980. 
Burgess, Jack (executive director, Columbus Education Association). Colum- 
bus, Ohio, 19 June 1980. 
Carmell, Sherman (union attorney). Chicago,  10 December  1985. 
Clark, R. Theodore (attorney for Illinois Municipal League). Telephone inter- 
Coleman, John (executive director, Ohio Municipal League). Columbus, Ohio, 
D’Alba, Joel (union attorney). Chicago, 10 December  1985. 
Davis, Jacky (general counsel, Ohio State Employment Relations Board). Co- 
lumbus, Ohio, 27 November  1984. 
Day, Donald (assistant executive director, AFSCME Council 8, Ohio). Colum- 
bus, Ohio, 23 June 1980. 
Day, Jack (chairman, Ohio State Employment  Relations Board).  Columbus, 
Ohio, 12 August  1986. 
De Guise, Earl (international vice president for Illinois and Ohio, International 
Association of Fire Fighters). Edwardsville, Illinois,  12 December  1985. 
Evans, Del (organizer and field representative, Ohio Civil Service Employees’ 
Association, AFSCME). Cincinnati, Ohio, 8 August  1986. 
Fix, Helen (commissioner, Ohio State Employment Relations Board, and for- 
mer assistant minority leader in the Ohio House of  Representatives).  Cin- 
cinnati, Ohio, 11 August  1986. 
Frankenfield, Richard (lobbyist, Illinois Education  Association).  Springfield, 
Illinois,  12 December  1985. 
Gibson, Bob (president, Illinois AFL-CIO). Chicago, 9 December  1985. 
Greiman, Alan (assistant majority  leader, Illinois House of  Representatives). 
Hall, Connie (director of  organizing and bargaining, Ohio Education Associ- 
Hall, John  (assistant executive  secretary and lobbyist,  Ohio Education  As- 
Heisel, Don (personnel director for the City of Cincinnati,  1955-68,  and as- 
view, 3 December  1985. 
24 June 1980. 
Chicago, 9 December  1985. 
ation). Columbus, Ohio,  12  August  1986. 
sociation). Columbus, Ohio, 23 June 1980. 
sistant personnel director,  1940-55).  Cincinnati, Ohio, 26 June 1980. 78  Gregory M.  Saltzman 
Jaffy, Stewart (general counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO). Columbus, Ohio, 12 August 
Kiley, Richard (president, Cincinnati Teachers’ Union, 1967-69).  Cincinnati, 
Looman, John (director, Public Employment Advisory and Counseling Effort 
McPike, Jim (majority leader, Illinois House of Representatives). Alton,  Illi- 
Marrone, John (associate professor, Labor Education and Research Service, 
Moody, Tom (president, Cincinnati Federation of Teachers). Cincinnati, Ohio, 
Morgan, Tom (legislative director, AFSCME Council 8, Ohio). Telephone in- 
O’Reilly, James (labor lawyer). Cincinnati, Ohio, 21  November 1984. 
Phalen, Tom (union attorney). Cincinnati, Ohio, 21  November 1984. 
Preckwinkle, Steve (lobbyist, AFSCME Council 31, Illinois).  Springfield, II- 
Roe, Charlotte (staff member, Ohio AFL-CIO). Columbus, Ohio, 19 June 1980. 
Russell, Harriet (president, Cincinnati Teachers’ Association,  1971 -75).  Cin- 
cinnati, Ohio, 26 June 1980. 
Schwartz, Lee (lobbyist in the state legislature for City of Chicago, 1971-75 
and 1983-84).  Chicago, 9 December 1985. 
Sheehan, Bill (vice-chairman, Ohio State Employment Relations Board; former 
secretary-treasurer, Cincinnati AFL-CIO). Cincinnati, Ohio, 21  November 
1984. 
Smith, Warren (executive secretary-treasurer, Ohio AFL-CIO). Columbus, Ohio, 
19 June 1980. 
Stallworth, Lamont (member, Illinois Local Labor Relations Board). New York 
City, 29 December 1985. 
Stephens, Roger (president,  Cincinnati Federation of Teachers, 1969-79).  Cin- 
cinnati, Ohio, 20 June 1980. 
Toto, John (international representative, AFSCME). Columbus, Ohio 12 August 
1986. 
Wagner, Martin (chairman, Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board). Chi- 
cago, 10 December 1985. 
Walsh, Rich (lobbyist, Illinois AFL-CIO). Springfield, Illinois,  11 December 
1985. 
Walters, Glen (Illinois president, International Association of Fire Fighters). 
Edwardsville, Illinois, 12  December 1985. 
1986. 
Ohio, 20 June 1980. 
Commission). Columbus, Ohio, 26 November 1984. 
nois, 12 December 1985. 
Ohio State University). Cincinnati, Ohio, 2 1 November 1984. 
25  June 1980. 
terview, 3 July 1980. 
linois,  II December 1985. 
Comment  William T.  Dickens 
I liked this paper when it was presented at the conference and had very 
few comments then. Since the author has dealt with nearly all of my 
complaints, I like the paper even more now and have less to  say. My 
remaining disagreements are very minor. 
William T. Dickens is associate professor of economics at the University of California, 
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First, I still think the paper undersells the results a bit. The paper 
shows conclusively that bargaining laws can affect the level of union 
density, at least in the public sector in Ohio and Illinois. A debate has 
been raging for many years over the question of whether laws matter 
or just reflect the sentiments of the populations  of the countries or 
states in which they are enacted. We  know that the Wagner Act was 
followed by a great surge in union density, and it has been observed 
that Canada and the United States-two  fairly similar countries with 
very different labor laws-have  very different union densities. Canada, 
where it is easier to organize, has the higher  density.  In both cases 
very respected scholars have argued that it is not the laws which make 
the difference but public opinion. This question is of immediate im- 
portance since there is also a debate over whether changing the labor 
law in this country could reverse the fortune of the union movement. 
As the paper shows, it is hard to argue that the changes in the laws 
in these two states reflect big shifts in the popularity of unions among 
the people in the state. The climate in the states is unchanged. In both 
cases the timing of the laws seems to be due to some chance occurrence 
in state politics unrelated to the question of public sector bargaining. 
Nonetheless the changes in the laws seem to be followed by big changes 
in union density. The only other paper that gets this close to being able 
to assess causation is Ellwood and Fine’s (1983) study‘ of the effects 
of right-to-work  laws. They too find that laws matter. Of course this 
does not mean that all provisions of state and federal labor laws are of 
similar importance, but it does add weight to the arguments of those 
who claim that changing the law could reverse the decline in  union 
density. 
My  major remaining critical  comment pertains to the results pre- 
sented in table 2.4. The coefficients and standard errors are estimated 
under the assumption that the errors for each district in each year are 
independent. This is clearly false, since unobserved factors  which make 
it likely that a district would change in one year also make it likely to 
change in  the next. The most likely effect of the failure of  this as- 
sumption is to bias the standard errors downward. Thus the results 
should be interpreted with some caution. Nonetheless, I do not believe 
that the bias could be big enough for the major finding, the large and 
significant coefficient on the dummy variable for the year the law took 
effect, to not hold up. The means in table 2.1 are enough to convince 
me. If the author wanted to do more he could have estimated the logit 
model in  table 2.3 for each year and compared the intercepts. This 
would have avoided the error components problem that results from 
grouping the data as he has. 
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